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:leblowers' Statute 
T he wrongful discharge cause of action for at will employees, as the leading labor law issue of the 80's, 
has highlighted employer-employee rela-
tions and has been analyzed extensively. I 
The attraction of the subject does not 
stem solely from the number of jurispru-
dential issues, nor from the possibility of 
socioeconomic commentary. It is also a 
subject that from the practical standpoint 
allows the potential for recovery of puni-
tive damages by plaintiffs and the resul-
tant impact upon corporate deep pockets. 
The potential economic impact upon a 
business as well as the enhanced power 
given to employees forces consideration 
by employers. 
At will employment encompasses all 
non-contractual workers. Based upon 
19th century concepts of free enterprise, 
the common law provides that employ-
ment, for an indefinite term, may be ter-
minated by either party at will. 2 The 
benefits of such an arrangement are un-
disputed. The very essence of business 
management may require the ability of 
the employer to dismiss employees at 
will. Arguments can be made that an em-
ployer need not be saddled with employees 
who are unable or unwilling to perform, 
or who the employer finds unsatisfactory 
for whatever reason. At the same time, 
the at will arrangement permits termina-
tion by employees with no explanation to 
the current employer. In its purest form, 
the doctrine does not consider the motive 
of either party. Termination may be arbi-
trary or with no reason at all. The wrong-
ful discharge cause of action acknowledges 
that the benefits of at will employment 
may be weighted more heavily on the side 
of the employer. Courts which have rec-
ognized the cause of action have restricted 
the employer's absolute right to discharge 
on either a public policy theory or on im-
plied contract terms. 3 
Maryland's Wrongful 
Discharge 
In Adler v. American Standard Corp. , 4 
on questions certified from the United 
States District Court for Maryland, the 
court of appeals held that Maryland rec-
ognizes the cause of action of wrongful 
discharge "when the motivation for the 
discharge contravenes some clear mandate 
of public policy." 5 The court did not pro-
claim that Adler was the first abrogation 
of the at will employment doctrine, since 
the purest form of the common law doc-
trine of at will employment which gave 
the employer the absolute right to dis-
charge, had previously been abrogated by 
statute in Maryland. 6 Those statutes, 
cited in footnote 1 of the Adler decision, 
provide that an employee may not be dis-
charged from his employment for: (1) a 
worker's compensation claim filed; (2) a 
Maryland Occupational Safety and Health 
Act (MOSHA) report; (3) jury service; or 
(4) a wage attachment under certain cir-
cumstances. 7 Although not cited in the 
Adler footnote, MD. ANN. CODE art. 
49B, § 16 (1979), prohibits discrimina-
tion in the discharge of employees on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, age, na-
tional origin, marital status, or physical or 
mental handicap unrelated to the employ-
ment. 8 Further, by statute employers may 
not discharge the employee for failure to 
submit to a lie detector test. 9 Of these 
statutes, only the MOSHA statute and 
the discrimination statute provide specific 
remedies to the employee. The others 
provide penalties, fines and/or imprison-
ment, for their violation. 
The socioeconomic reality of the work 
force of the 1980's is that at will employees 
represent the majority of all employees. 
Businesses in general are larger than they 
were at the time of the creation of the at 
will doctrine. Acknowledging economic 
changes, the Adler court devised a very 
careful balancing of interests. The court 
recognized that in today's economy, an 
employee cannot meet financial obliga-
tions without employment and that the 
current job market is not such that one 
can expect that after termination, he 
would be hired immediately for another 
job. Such marketplace and economic con-
ditions add to the value of job security to 
the individual; however, that interest in 
job security does not outweigh the inter-
est of business in being able to dismiss an 
employee with whom there is genuine 
dissatisfaction. When there is termina-
tion, the court would not substitute ju-
dicial review for business judgment in an 
effort to protect the job security interest 
of an individual. The only examples by 
the court specifying the interests of the 
employee that would outweigh the inter-
ests of the business are when the employee 
has been terminated for refusal to act in an 
unlawful manner or for the performance 
by the employee of a statutorily prescribed 
duty. The court suggests a difference 
between employees who are asked by 
employers to commit illegal acts and 
employees who discover illegal activity 
within the corporation. 
The balance is between the individual 
interest in job security versus the business 
interest in being able to discharge any em-
ployee. The third interest that the court 
considered important was the interest of 
society "in ensuring that its laws and im-
portant public policies are not contra-
vened." 10 What the court secured for the 
at will employee - a cause of action, sound-
ing in tort with the potential of punitive 
damages-was very carefully limited by 
cloaking it with the requirement that the 
motivation for discharge must be contrary 
to a "clear mandate of public policy." The 
law of Adler leads to the conclusion that an 
at will employee may recover for wrong-
ful discharge, however, absent a statute to 
demonstrate the mandate of public policy, 
the burden of pleading such a discharge 
may, in fact, be nearly impossible. There-
fore, the result is that a statute may be 
necessary to provide the mandate of pub-
lic policy. 
Allegations of Illegal 
Corporate Activities 
Adler, a $60,000.00 per year manage-
ment employee alleged that termination 
by his employer was motivated by his 
previously reported suspicions of im-
proper and possible illegal practices of the 
defendant-corporation. The alleged im-
proprieties included payment of commer-
cial bribes and falsification of corporate 
records in violation of the criminal law. 
Adler alleged that such practices were 
contrary to public policy; that the crim-
inal law prohibiting fraudulent represen-
tations concerning corporate affairs ex-
pressed the public policy that prohibited 
such illegal practices. II The Court dis-
missed the Adler complaint with leave to 
amend. The failure to plead a violation of 
the criminal statute, without which there 
was no violation of public policy, resulted 
in the dismissal. The inference is that 
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when a plaintiff alleges that the motiva-
tion for his discharge was the result of his 
report of some criminal activity of his 
employer, to that employer, then he must 
allege all the elements of the crime, in-
cluding the necessary criminal intent of 
his employer. 
In Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corpora-
tion,12 a case similar to Adler, a vice-
president of the defendant-corporation al-
leged that he had been discharged because 
he had reported to his superiors that there 
was a possible embezzlement of corporate 
funds. This discovery was made in the 
course of his employment and brought to 
the attention of the president and the 
chief operating officer. The Illinois court 
held that the employee had alleged facts 
sufficient to withstand the employer's 
motion to dismiss because "public policy 
... favors citizen crime fighters." 13 The 
difference between the. two cases stems 
from the required specificity of pleading 
and not significant differences between 
the courts on the broad spectrum covered 
by public policy. 
Adler and Petrik both involved employ-
ees who learned of alleged criminal activ-
ity from their positions that gave them 
access to the information while acting 
within the scope of their employment. 
Both cases involved management level 
employees who discovered illegal activi-
ties and reported them within the cor-
porate structure. Each employee demon-
strated loyalty to at least the corporate 
hierarchy when he reported the alleged 
wrongdoing first within the corporation. 
In effect, both employees expected to be 
rewarded for venting their concerns in-
ternally before notitying outsiders. Should 
either have reasonably expected rewards 
for revealing knowledge of illegal acts of 
superiors? It can be asked why either 
plaintiff was motivated to pursue the 
wrongful discharge cause of action, when 
the possibility of relief was so remote. 
The answer, short of vindication, prob-
ably rests with the stigma that would re-
sult from the termination by an employer 
who could tell future employers that the 
reason for discharge was dissatisfaction 
with the employee. The result is that the 
employee is not only left without a cur-
rent job, but may be left without job pros-
pects in the future. 
Statutory Expressions of 
Public Policy 
There is no universally accepted defini-
tion of public policy. The conservative in-
terpretation of courts in the wrongful dis-
charge cause of action context is in terms 
of legislative enactments. The most lib-
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eral definition is in terms of what is in the 
best interest of the general public. Al-
though Adler appears sweeping in its pro-
tection of at will employees, the decision 
is restrictive because the court requires a 
clear mandate of public policy and "that 
declaration of public policy is normally 
the function of the legislative branch." 14 
In addition, in Chekey v. BTR Realty,15 
Judge Miller, applying Maryland law, 
stated that "when a statutory scheme pro-
vides a remedy for injury, that statutory 
scheme provides an exclusive remedy 
which preempts application of general 
civil common law, absent indication by 
the legislature to the contrary." 16 
It is suggested, therefore, that the Mary-
land legislature must take action to pro-
vide the court with specific statutory pro-
visions upon which it can find a clear 
mandate of public policy in situations 
where an employee is privy to informa-
tion which suggests possible criminal ac-
tivity of the employer, without the neces-
sity of the employee pleading the necessary 
elements of the criminal violation. Other 
jurisdictions have enacted such statutes, 
referred to as "Whistleblowers' statutes," 
to protect employees. The purposes of 
these statutes are to provide protection 
and civil remedies to employees who re-
port a violation or suspected violation of 
federal, state, or local law by his em-
ployer. In addition, the statutes provide 
protection for employees who participate 
in hearings, investigations, legislative in-
quiries or court actions. 
Three jurisdictions with protective em-
ployee statutes are Connecticut, Michigan 
and Maine. 17 The basic similarities of the 
statutes are that all three provide protec-
tion and remedies for the employee, who 
on his own or through another acting on 
his behalf, reports, verbally or in writing, 
a violation or suspected violation of a 
state, local, or federal law or regulation to 
a public body. The Maine statute extends 
the protection to an employee who reports 
the alleged violation to the employer, as 
well as a public body. It requires, how-
ever, that the employee first bring the vio-
lation to the attention of a supervisor un-
less the employee has "specific reason" to 
believe that the employer will not remedy 
the violation. The employee is not re-
quired to be certain, or be able to prove, 
that the act of the employer is a violation 
of the law. In Michigan, the statute re-
quires that the employee prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that "he or she 
or a person acting on his or her behalf was 
about to report, verbally or in writing, a 
violation or a suspected violation of a law 
of this state, a political subdivision of this 
state, or the United States to a public 
body." 18 Likewise, the Maine statute re-
quires proof of each element by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. The available 
remedies provided in all three statutes in-
clude reinstatement, back wages, fringe 
benefits, seniority, costs of litigation, at-
torneys' fees and in Maine and Michigan, 
witness fees and injunctive relief. 
The enactment of a Whistleblowers' 
statute in Maryland would provide the 
clear mandate of public policy sought by 
the Adler Court. Adler, a management 
employee, had responsibility for the anal-
ysis and accuracy of certain divisional in-
formation. Inadequacies, as well as im-
proper and possibly illegal practices, 
discovered in the course of his employ-
ment were reported to his supervisors. 
Adler acted within the corporate structure 
in reporting his findings. There is no sug-
gestion that Adler ever considered report-
ing the possible illegal practices to anyone 
outside the corporation. The Maine stat-
ute would provide a remedy to Adler since 
he made the report to the employer. Adop-
tion of a statute similar to those in Michi-
gan and Connecticut would not provide a 
remedy, since he did not report his sus-
picions to a public body; however, the 
statute could represent the clear mandate 
of public policy that is required by Adler. 
Further, the Michigan statute does not re-
quire that the employee actually report 
the alleged violation to a public body, but 
only that his discharge occurred and he 
"was about to report" the suspected viola-
tion. 19 The employee does not bear the 
burden of pleading the actual violation of 
law. 
Arguments against enactment of a 
Whistleblowers' statute include the basic 
business management position that a bus-
iness cannot properly or profitably oper-
ate if every employee has the right to sec-
ond guess the legality and/or morality of 
all management decisions. Simply stated, 
an employee who thinks that his employer 
is acting illegally should be so dissatisfied 
that he should terminate his employment 
unilaterally. Ideally, if an employee sus-
pects that the business is not operating 
legally, he should not want to be em-
ployed by that business. Realistically, fi-
nancial considerations of an individual 
employee may not allow him the luxury 
of such idealism. At the same time, an 
employee who has reported to supervisors 
that he believes that illegal activities are 
taking place must realize the risk that he 
is taking and expect that supervisors may 
question his loyalty to the employer. 
The employee, however, deserves the 
protection of a Whistleblowers' statute 
because job security is valuable, particu-
larly when unemployment is high. Ter-
mination may leave the employee with 
depressed job prospects when his only 
failing was the refusal to ignore what rea-
sonably appeared to him to be illegal 
practices of his employer. With the de-
mand for less government, the question 
arises of whether wrongful discharge or 
a Whistleblowers' statute infuse unneces-
sary governmental interference with pri-
vate industry. According to Adler, that 
question is answered by the balancing of 
the three interests: individual, business 
and society. The interest of society in en-
forcement ofits criminal laws may tip the 
scale in favor of the enactment of a Mary-
land Whistleblowers' statute. 
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The dissent of Justice Brennan, with 
whom Justice Marshall joined, stressed 
that the delay in the search removes any 
exigency that may impair reasonable ef-
forts to obtain a warrant. Accordingly, 
the dissent insisted that there lacked any 
of the justifications for not adhering to 
the fourteenth amendment's warrant re-
quirement. 
The Court's decision is dangerous be-
cause it shows a total disregard for that 
tenuous connection between rules and their 
justifications. The automobile exception 
was based on narrow justifications; the 
impracticality of obtaining a warrant on 
something as mobile as a vehicle, the dimin-
ished expectation of privacy, and the safety 
of law enforcement officers. But once a 
closed container is taken from the automo-
bile and placed in a warehouse, those justi-
fications have evaporated. Departing from 
the established justifications makes it easier 
for future courts to make further unsup-
ported extensions, which jeopardize the 
fourteenth and fourth amendments' protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
In addition, by not narrowly applying 
the warrant requirement, the Court runs 
the risk that otherwise diligent police of-
ficers will momentarily become unob-
servant so that the stated focus of the 
search will be the vehicle, and not the 
package contained within the vehicle. 
This momentary lapse removes the search 
from United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 
1 (1977) which states that if the suspicion 
is focused on the closed container, a war-
rant is required, and puts it within United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). This 
becomes an unwise rule when it rewards 
otherwise trivial differences in police sur-
veillance by dispensing with the warrant 
requirement. A better position would be to 
resist the temptation to extend the automo-
bile exception, and limit the exceptions to 
the warrant requirement to those within 
the ambit of the original justifications. 
-Michael Burgoyne 
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